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Initiated in 1990, the Human Genome Project has sought to identify
each gene on a human being's twenty-three pairs of chromosomes and then
arrange them into a "map."' The completion of the project was announced
on April 14, 2003.2 A landmark achievement for all of mankind, the
genetic map's completion has also left society confused by its conflicting
costs and benefits: while many potential medical advances are expected to
flow from this genetic map, there is an additional concern that its
completion has identified a new form of discrimination which surges
through our veins. While lawmakers have been struggling to pass bills
which explicitly combat genetic discrimination since 1995, recent scientific
breakthroughs like the completion of the human genome map have given
this issue a higher priority. Before this discovery, the potential for
employers to abuse genetic information was more of an impending fear
than a scientific reality. Now these fears are rapidly materializing, and
attempts to regulate this discrimination, specifically in the areas of health
care and employment law,3 are quickly being taken more seriously.4
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has been the primary
recourse for Americans with disabilities or handicaps in the area of
employment.5  Legislators are divided in their views as to whether
t J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. For a more in depth discussion of the history and goals of the Human Genome
Project, see Jared A. Feldman and Richard J. Katz, Note, Genetic Testing & Discrimination
in Employment: Recommending a Uniform Statutory Approach, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 389, 391-92 (2002).
2. NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM COMPLETES
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Apr. 14, 2003), at http://www.genome.gov/11006929.
3. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong.
(2003) (prohibiting employers and health insurers from discriminating on the basis of
genetic information).
4. See generally, Preface to GENETICS POLICY REPORT: EMPLOYMENT ISSUES v (Cheye
Calvo & Alissa Johnson eds., 2001) (noting the formation of the Genetic Technologies
Project as a bipartisan effort to create sound policies in response to advances in human
genetics).
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000).
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additional genetic nondiscrimination legislation is needed at all.6 Yet, the
most recent genetic nondiscrimination legislation (S. 1053) easily rifled its
way through the Senate7 despite lobbyists' vigorous contention that the
additional legislation was unnecessary! A number of states have passed
legislation to address the issue of genetic discrimination, as it is not
explicitly mentioned in the ADA. However, there is wide variation in the
scope and extent of coverage offered by these laws, and some states have
not initiated any legislation at all. The present level of protection against
genetic discrimination is wholly insufficient: it is erratic among some
states, deficient among others, and completely lacking in the rest. As yet,
there have been no cases of genetic discrimination successfully litigated
under the ADA.9 The recent Supreme Court decision of Chevron USA Inc.
v. Echazabal'° highlights the problems that may result when and if genetic
discrimination litigation is brought under the ADA. Echazabal is the most
recent "call to arms" for instituting a genetic discrimination policy that is
consistent across state lines.
In this Comment, I will first provide background on the issue of
genetic discrimination in the workplace and on how a claim alleging
genetic discrimination can be brought under the ADA. I will then explain
why the ADA by itself is insufficient to prevent genetic discrimination.
In Part II, I will discuss existing state and federal statutory schemes
which have been introduced in an attempt to prevent employers from
gaining access to genetic test results. I will also discuss the Genetic
6. See, e.g., Matt Mientka, Congress Debates 'Genetic Discrimination' Bills, U.S.
MEDICINE, at http://www.usmedicine.com/dailyNews.cfm?dailylD=79 (last visited Jan. 28,
2005) ("Republicans fear that overly broad regulation would clog the courts and place
employers between 'a rock and a hard place,' while Democrats advocate 'plugging gaps'
left by the Americans with Disabilities Act").
7. See Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress, S. 1053, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01053: @ @ @X (last visited Jan. 28, 2005)
(announcing a passage of the S. 1053 by a vote of 95-0 in the Senate).
8. See, e.g., Statement of LPA Concerning S. 318, The Genetic Nondiscrimination in
Health Insurance and Employment Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong., 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter Statement of LPA ], available at
http://www.hrpolicy.org/memoranda/2001/01-128_GenDiscTestimony-Senate.pdf ("[The
prong of the ADA which protects individuals who are 'regarded as' having impairments] is
designed to protect against unfounded myths, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with
disabilities and reflects Congress' determination that the reaction of others to an impairment
or a perceived impairment should be prohibited the same way as discrimination based on an
actual impairment.").
9. One case, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp., got close to the issue when
employees claimed that the railroad generally tested track workers without their knowledge
in violation of the ADA. Steve Bates, Senate May Consider Genetic Bias Legislation,
SHRM NEWS (May 30, 2003). The case did not end up going to trial, since Burlington
settled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for $2.2 million in May 2002.
Id.
10. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
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Information Nondiscrimination Act, the newest legislation addressing
genetic discrimination which was recently passed in the Senate. Finally, I
will provide a brief discussion on whether state or federal legislation is a
more fitting statutory approach.
In Part 11, I will explore the Supreme Court ruling in Chevron USA
Inc. v. Echazabal, which extended an employer's ability to assert the direct
threat defense. According to Echazabal, the defense now includes a threat
to oneself, supporting the EEOC's broad interpretation of the language of
the ADA, which explicitly includes only "threat to others" in its statutory
language.
Part IV will discuss the ramifications of Echazabal for an individual
alleging genetic discrimination under the ADA. A paternalistic decision
like Echazabal has potentially devastating effects for workers if more
consistent state or federal legislation is not enacted in the area of genetic
discrimination. For example, based on the results of genetic tests, one with
a propensity for a certain disease may be legally barred from obtaining a
particular job because the employer considers working at the job to be a
"direct threat" to that individual's own health. Such an attitude is likely to
instill fear among workers whose chances of gaining recourse for such
employer action depends on the scope of coverage provided by a
patchwork of ADA provisions and coverage in the state where the worker
resides.
Finally, Part V discusses some recent decisions, and analyses the
affect Echazabal has had on an employer's ability to assert the newly-
created "threat to self' defense.
I. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADA
A. Genetic Discrimination and its Place in the Context of Employment Law
It is difficult even for experts to agree on a definition of "genetic
discrimination," and it is not a term with which most people are familiar.
Yet advances in science and technology require an advance in both our
awareness and our level of understanding of this concept. Robert Olick,
author and expert in the area of law and bioethics,"1 defines genetic
discrimination as "negative differential treatment of an individual based
solely upon that person's possession of one or more genetic traits that
deviate from the 'normal' genome, or on the perception that the individual
possesses one or more genetic traits that deviate from the 'norm,' when that
11. Robert S. Olick, J.D., Ph.D. directs the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues in
Medicine component of the medical school curriculum at the State of New York Upstate
Medical University, and he is also an associate professor in the Center for Bioethics and
Humanities.
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person is asymptomatic."' 2 The human genome has now been mapped,
giving more meaning to the genetic information stored in each of our cells.
Information can now be derived from genetic tests of an individual and his
or her family members, or from one's family history.
In the employment context, the greatest concern anticipated in the area
of genetic discrimination is that employers will begin basing their hiring,
firing, assignment, promotion, and wage, term, and benefit negotiation
decisions on the results of predictive genetic tests. 3 Genetic tests seek to
identify the presence or absence of certain genetic markers, which can
indicate one's propensity to develop a particular disease or disorder. While
the presence of some of these markers indicate that an individual will be
highly likely to develop a disease in the course of his or her lifetime (for
example, Huntington's or Tay-Sach' S),4 the majority of these markers are
indicators that an individual is merely "predisposed" for getting the
disease.15 To demonstrate the potential of the problem, even if a person has
a genetic propensity for Huntington's Disease, one of the disorders that is
highly predictive, the individual still has only a fifty percent chance of
actually developing it. 16 Until the individual does, he may be completely
asymptomatic.17  The rest of that fifty percent will never contract the
disease at all.
Surely, letting an employer gain access to this predictive information
exposes an applicant or an employee to the chance of not being hired at all,
being denied a conditional offer, or being fired because of test results,
while the employer offers pretextual explanations for the decision. On the
12. Robert S. Olick, Genes in the Workplace: New Frontiers for ADA Law, Policy, and
Research, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 285,
288 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000).
13. An additional concern is employee privacy, but that will not be explored in the
scope of this Comment.
14. Olick, supra note 12, at 291.
15. Id.; see also Leroy Hood & Lee Rowen, Genes, Genomes, and Society, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 3, 20 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 1997) ("Some sequence variations... within genes invariably cause
disease.... More commonly, a defective version of a gene inherited from one parent can be
fully or partially compensated by the normal version of the gene inherited from the other
parent.... Alternatively, inheritance of a defective gene may result in a continuous gradient
of phenotype ranging from no effect to explicit disease.... [S]ome [genetic variations] are
associated with a probability of getting a disease."). For an intriguing and fairly simplistic
understanding of DNA and its relationship with the rest of the body, see RICHARD DAWKINS,
THE SELFISH GENE 12-45 (New Edition, 1989). Dawkins writes, "[a] given part of the body
will be influenced by many genes, and the effect of any one gene depends on interaction
with many others. Some genes act as master genes controlling the operation of a cluster of
other genes." Id. at 24.




employer's end, incentives to base employment decisions on predictive
information are great and could likely save the employer the future costs
(for example, disability, worker's compensation, and health-care related
costs) associated with taking on the "potentially-defective" worker.
Genetic discrimination is a scary prospect since it can be based on
information that is highly speculative-a worker may be denied an
employment opportunity yet never actually contract the disease that is
written in his genes.
B. Bringing Suit for Genetic Discrimination Under the ADA
1. The History of the ADA Reveals its Attempts to Move Away from
Paternalism
The ADA was enacted in 1990 in response to Congressional concern
about the growing number of people with disabilities encountering a
disproportionate lack of opportunity and level of outright discrimination as
compared to ordinary Americans. 18 Until the ADA was passed, the United
States had adopted what was known as a "medical" or "charity" model of
disability: there were assistance programs (in the form of health care,
vocational rehabilitation, income supports, and the like) to give aid to the
disabled; however, the ADA was one of the first empowering pieces of
disability legislation. 19 The same support system as before was available
for the disabled, but after the passage of the ADA, those affected had a
recourse for stereotyping and a remedy for discrimination. An indication
of the move away from paternalism is embedded in the legislative history
of the ADA itself: one of Congress' main intents was to prohibit employers
from denying someone an employment opportunity because of paternalistic
concerns regarding that person's own health.2 °
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a) (2000) (stating Congress' nine specific findings).
19. U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA 31
(1998).
20. See D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother's Keeper: Disabilities, Paternalism, and
Threats to Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 55, 68 (2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356) ("The legislative history of the
ADA clearly shows that one of Congress's purposes under the ADA was to ensure that
employers may not deny a person an employment opportunity based on paternalistic
concerns regarding the person's own health."); see also Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73,
86 n.5 (noting that the concerns regarding paternalism are rooted in the possibility of
pretextual decisions).
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2. Asymptomatic Individuals are "Regarded as Having a Disability"
Under the ADA
Liberally defined by the ADA,21 the term "disability" has been found
to encompass discrimination based on genetic abnormalities: although the
legislation does not specifically target genetic discrimination in its
language, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) takes
the position that genetic discrimination is prohibited under the definition of
"disability" that protects individuals who are regarded as having an
impairment under section 12,102(2)(C).22 Thus, at least as far as the EEOC
is concerned, individuals who are presymptomatic or genetically
predisposed to getting a particular disease are covered under the statutory
scheme of the ADA.23 There is, however, significant debate about whether
the EEOC's interpretation coincides with Congressional intent.24
By enabling individuals to bring suit whether they were actually
disabled as well as if they were simply regarded as such, Congress intended
to expand the ADA to include all those who felt the effect of
discrimination, even if it arose more from stereotypes than from an actual
disability. 2 The Senate Committee stated:
21. The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12,102(2) (2000).
22. See Definition of the Term "Disability," 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), EEOC
Order 915.002, at 902-45, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 16, 1995, at E-1, E-23;
see also Statement of LPA, supra note 8, at 2 (arguing that Senate legislation for genetic
nondiscrimination is already sufficiently covered by ADA legislation).
23. Statement of LPA, supra note 8, at 2; Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and
Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281, 289 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
24. Olick, supra note 12, at 295-96. In his article, Olick reviews several
commentators' remarks on whether the ADA was, in fact, enacted with genetic
discrimination in mind. His conclusion is that, had the state of genetic technologies been
more advanced at the time the legislation was passed, the ADA would have more
specifically addressed the issue. Id. For added discussion of legislative intent, see Mark A.
Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
29 Hous. L. REV. 23, 49-50 (1992) (noting that it is unclear how the ADA will be
interpreted).
25. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA,
No. 15, THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS DISCUSSING THE "REGARDED As" PRONG OF THE
ADA DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 2-4 (May 21, 2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/regardedas.pdf (noting that the third prong
protects those who are regarded as having a disability even if they are not actually disabled).
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Clause [iii] in the new definition clarifies the intention to include
those persons who are discriminated against on the basis of
handicap, whether or not they are in fact handicapped .... This
subsection ... includes those persons who do not in fact have the
condition they are perceived as having, as well as those persons
whose mental or physical condition does not substantially limit
their life activities and who thus are not technically within clause
[i] of the new definition. Members of both of these groups may
be subjected to discrimination ....
The Supreme Court has since spoken on the criteria used to determine
whether an entity has "regarded" an individual as disabled under prong
three of the ADA's definition.27 In order to fall within the statutory
definition, the individual must show that the employer-entity either: 1)
believes that the candidate has "a physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more.., major life activities" when one actually does not
have the impairment at all, or 2) "believes that an actual, non-limiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 28  In
fleshing out these criteria, the court stated:
[An employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or
medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an
impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing voice-are
preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting,
but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less
than ideally suited for a job.29
The Sutton Court further eroded the "regarded as" definition and the
ability of an individual to bring suit under the third prong of the ADA. The
Court found that the existence of other types of jobs which require the same
skills as the one for which the petitioner was denied employment precludes
a finding that the employer has regarded the individual as having a
substantially limiting impairment since a number of other positions using
the individual's skills were available.3°
While Sutton may have been decided correctly under its own facts, the
26. Id. at 3, quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373,
6389-90.
27. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1999). In Sutton, an
allegation that United Air Lines had a vision requirement in place did not, without more,
establish that the entity regarded the petitioners (who were denied employment as global
airline pilots) as disabled. Id.
28. Id. at 489.
29. Id. at 490-91.
30. Id. at 493.
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holding may have a dire effect on individuals attempting to bring a claim of
genetic discrimination under the third prong of the ADA. The Court
acknowledges that discrimination may be allowed if an individual has a
limiting condition, as long as it does not limit "substantially." The fear is
that employers may be able to use genetic screening processes to
preference certain individuals over others in the employment arena. These
biased employment decisions may be able to find support rendered in
Sutton: since the medical condition to which the employee is predisposed is
not "substantially limiting" at the time when the screening is done, perhaps
the employer is "free to decide" that the impairment makes the employee
less than ideally suited for the position. Further, as long as there are other
jobs available to the individual which require the same skill set as the one
he was denied employment for, the preferential hiring practices may not be
considered unlawful under prong three of the ADA.
Sutton thus poses a powerful road block for individuals who may try
to bring suit for genetic discrimination claiming they were "regarded as"
having a disability when they were denied employment because of
predictive genetic tests. Under Sutton, it is quite possible that an
asymptomatic individual who is prone to a genetic condition may be legally
denied employment because of a potentially limiting impairment, so long
as there are other similar jobs available to him.
While courts have dealt with cases that address the ADA's coverage
of asymptomatic individuals,31 no cases of genetic discrimination have
been brought thus far under the ADA, and a detailed discussion as to
whether the ADA was intended to extend its coverage to genetic
discrimination is beyond the scope of this Comment. For the purposes of
this discussion, I will assume that a case of genetic discrimination can be
brought and would be allowed under the ADA.
C. Applicants and Employees are Left Exposed when Genetic Tests are
Considered "Medical Examinations and Inquiries" Under the ADA
Even if genetic tests are classified as "medical examinations and
inquiries" (as they would be if a case were to be litigated under the ADA),
employers remain limited as to how and when they can test applicants and
employees. With regard to applicants, medical inquiries regarding an
individual's disability or the severity of the disability are only allowed if
they are job-related. With respect to conditional employees, generalized
medical tests are allowed as long as all employees, regardless of disability,
are administered the test and as long as the information is kept
31. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1998) (holding that an asymptomatic
individual with HIV could bring suit under the ADA because it was an impairment that
substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction).
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confidential.32
In a recent case, plaintiffs voluntarily subjected themselves to a urine
test for a post-offer entrance exam. Instead, the test was used
disproportionately among blacks and women to check for syphilis, sickle
cell, and pregnancy.33 Plaintiffs brought claims under both Title VII and
the ADA. Plaintiffs argued that, under the provisions of the ADA, their
employer was prohibited from administering any entrance examinations. 34
While the court acknowledged that plaintiffs' Title VII claims had validity,
it affirmed the dismissal of the ADA claims, stating that "the ADA imposes
no restriction on the scope of entrance examinations; it only guarantees the
confidentiality of the information gathered... and restricts the use to
which an employer may put the information. 35 The court further explained
that, according to 29 C.F.R. section 1630.14(b)(3), the results of these tests
could be used to exclude an individual on the basis of a disability as long as
the criteria themselves were job-related and consistent with business
necessity.36
This case exemplifies one reason why ADA coverage for genetic
discrimination is inadequate. If the ADA's definition of "medical tests"
includes genetic tests, then employers can simply require medical "genetic
screening" tests as a preemployment requirement. As long as employers
administer the test to all employees, they are acting legally and are within
the bounds of ADA regulations.37 In the process, they become privy to the
predictive genetic information for all of their potential employees.
Despite the fact that employers cannot determine which employees
have genetic abnormalities based on physical appearance, and despite the
fact that employers are prohibited from discriminately administering
32. 42 U.S.C § 12,112(d)(2)(B) (2000) states, "[a] covered entity may make
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions."
Section 12,112(d)(3) states,
[a] covered entity may require a medical examination after an offer of
employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement
of the employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer of
employment on the results of such examination if-
(A) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of
disability; [and]
(B) information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the
applicant is collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical
files and is treated as a confidential medical record...
Id.
33. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.
1998).
34. Id. at 1271-74.
35. Id. at 1273.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3)(A).
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medical tests under the ADA, employers can still figure out who is
genetically predisposed for every disease by simply testing all employees.
Once an employer has determined which employees are at risk for which
genetic disorders, it then has many options. First, the employer can chose
not to hire the genetically predisposed individual, covering up this choice
by claiming it was for a reason unrelated to the person's "bad genes."
Second, under section 12,113(a) of the ADA, the employer can claim that
the genetic predisposition is job-related and that it is consistent with
business necessity not to hire the person. Third, under section 12,113(b) of
the ADA, the employer can claim that the individual poses a direct threat to
others. Finally, under the recent Supreme Court decision in Echazabal, an
employer can claim that it is acting in the best interest of an applicant by
refusing to hire the individual because their genetic predisposition creates a
direct threat to their own health or safety. 8
II. IS THE ADA NOT ENOUGH? EXAMPLES OF "GAP-FILLING"
LEGISLATION TO BOLSTER THE ADA
A. Executive Order 13,145
Recently, there has been an attempt to pass federal legislation that
specifically targets genetic discrimination. Before leaving office, President
Clinton signed Executive Order 13,145, which forbids federal employers or
those receiving federal funding from discriminating based on protected
genetic information.39 The order (with certain exceptions) prohibits federal
employers from using, requesting, requiring, collecting, purchasing, and
disclosing "protected genetic information." 40 The order certainly is a sign
that the issue of genetic discrimination has become important enough to
receive attention at the executive level. Unfortunately, the order has
several major downfalls. For one, it is limited in scope, covering only
those applying for federal employment. In addition, its exceptions are
numerous and extensive.4' While the order gave added publicity to the
problem of genetic discrimination, federal employees need more protection
than this order provides. Even more importantly, the entire American work
force needs this protection, not just those employed by the federal
38. Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
39. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
40. Id. at 6878. "Protected genetic information" is defined as: "information about an
individual's genetic tests; information about the genetic tests of an individual's family
members; or information about the occurrence of a disease, or medical condition or disorder
in family members of the individual." Id.
41. See id. at 6879 (carving out exceptions for employers who monitor harmful toxins,




B. The United States Senate Makes Another Attempt at Regulation: The
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 would bar
employers from using an individual's genetic information in employment
decisions. 2 The bill prohibits employers, labor organizations, employment
agencies, and joint labor-management committees from requesting,
requiring, or purchasing genetic information of employees.4 ' The bill also
limits the liability of employers to cases of intentional genetic biases,
stating that those who learn of employee conditions inadvertently will not
be subject to damages unless the information is used in an intentionally
discriminatory manner.44 Finally, the bill prohibits any disclosure of
genetic test results except to the employee, health researchers, or in
compliance with federal and state law.45 The legislation is an admirable
attempt to regulate a complicated area of employment law. While
criticisms of the bill abound, the Senate should be applauded for
preemptively addressing a problem that could have devastating effects for
many Americans in the near future.
C. Efforts to Supplement the ADA Through State Legislation
Assuming the ADA is the proper venue to regulate genetic
discrimination once it has occurred, the issue still remains that the ADA
was designed to protect against discrimination; it was not designed to
prohibit the gathering of the information in the first place. 6 States have
recognized that the predictive nature of genetic information creates the
potential for employers to abuse it, and many have responded accordingly
through various types of legislation.
Most state legislation specifically limiting the use of genetic
information in the workplace began after the Human Genome Project
started in the early 1990's, although a few states regulated the sickle cell
trait in the 1970's and 80'S.4 7 Generally, states have adopted one of two
approaches to legislation-"exceptional" or "inclusive." The "exceptional"
view requires genetic information to be addressed separately from other




46. MAPPING PUBLIC POLICY FOR GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES, 8.4 (Brenda A. Trolin ed.,
1998).
47. GENETICS POLICY REPORT: EMPLOYMENT ISSUES 2-3 (Cheye Calvo & Alissa
Johnson eds., 2001).
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types of health information because it is so unique. 4' The "inclusive" view
treats genetic information in the same way that any other health
information is treated.49 The inclusive category can be further subdivided
into two categories-the first seeks to incorporate standards for the use of
genetic information into current workplace protections, while the second
attempts to strengthen existing disability protections or create new
protections based on current or future health status .5
Federal lawmakers seem to have fallen behind in the race to legislate
genetic discrimination.5 As of 2001, twenty-one states have passed laws
which place special restrictions on employers wishing to acquire genetic
information 2  Out of these states, employers are prohibited from
requesting information in seventeen states, from performing genetic tests in
thirteen states, and from obtaining genetic information from any source in
nine states.53 Oftentimes, however, employers are exempted from onerous
testing restrictions if tests are performed in limited "job-related" situations.
These include measuring abilities that are essential to performing a job,
monitoring employees for exposure to harmful toxins or chemicals, and
testing for susceptibility to a disease if working in a position where
exposure to certain toxins is likely. 4
Maryland, home to the NIH's Human Genome Project, is an example
of a state with a thorough, "exceptional" policy. For one, it bars employers
from requiring employees to submit to genetic testing as a condition for
employment 5  Furthermore, it refuses to allow this type of information
from being used in the calculus of wages, bonuses, and raises.56 Maryland
also specifically makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate because
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 4. Illinois and Michigan are examples of two states which adopt the first type
of inclusive approach, while California and Minnesota have implemented laws from the
second type of inclusive category. Id.
51. Katherine A. Hathaway, Comment, Federal Genetic Nondiscrimination Legislation:
The New "Right" and the Race to Protect DNA at the Local, State, and Federal Level, 52
CATH. U. L. REv. 133, 170 (2002).
52. GENETICS POLICY REPORT: EMPLOYMENT ISSUES, supra note 47, at 14.
53. Id. According to another source, the number may be even higher. Erin Heath
suggests that as many as twenty-eight states have passed some form of legislation banning
genetic discrimination by employers. Erin Heath, Zipping Up Genes Discrimination, NAT'L
J. July 21, 2001; see also LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., GENETICS POLICY AND LAW: A
REPORT FOR POLICYMAKERS 26 (2001) (As of 2001, "[t]wenty-eight states forbid genetic
discrimination in employment," twenty-two states "required informe consent of the
individual for genetic testing" and third party disclosure, and four states "define genetic
information as personal property.").
54. GENETICS POLICY AND LAW, supra note 47, at 14-15.
55. Hathaway, supra note 51, at 171.
56. Id.
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of a predisposition for a disease or disorder.57 Similar to Federal ADA
legislation, Maryland's laws apply only to companies with fifteen or more
employees.58
If the ADA left any room for question as to whether it covers genetic
discrimination, states with laws as broad as Maryland's certainly patch this
ambiguity. Those who believe that genetic discrimination should be
addressed at the state level laud this type of legislation. 59 However, leaving
this area to individual state regulation will inevitably lead to
inconsistencies because each state will choose varying breadths of
coverage. This means that employees and employers alike will have
insufficient warning as to what is acceptable under the law,60 and the cost
of determining what is permissible in each state will be a huge burden for
companies operating across state lines.
III. THE SUPREME COURT EXTENDS THE SCOPE OF THE DIRECT THREAT
DEFENSE UNDER ECHAZ4BAL
A direct threat is defined as "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation., 61 It is
an affirmative defense, clearly stated in the language of the ADA, which
employers can assert in defending their decision to not hire or to fire
individuals.62 Several factors have been traditionally weighed to determine
if an individual presents a "direct threat" to others: first, the duration of the
risk; second, the nature and severity of the potential harm; third, the
likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and fourth, the imminence of
the potential harm.63 The EEOC, however, has gone a step further in its
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Candice Hoke, Is There a Pink Slip in your Genes? Genetic
Discrimination in Employment and in Health Insurance: Reasons to Eschew Federal
Lawmaking and Embrace Common Law Approaches to Genetic Discrimination, 16 J.L. &
HEALTH 53, 55 (2001-2002) (suggesting states regulate the arena of genetic discrimination
since we are still in the infant stages of dealing with the issue of genetic discrimination, we
have not had time to evaluate the initiatives taken by states in dealing with it, and federal
legislation oftentimes is an inefficient way of expressing political power).
60. Deborah Gridley, Note, Genetic Testing Under the ADA: A Case for Protection
from Employment Discrimination, 89 GEO. L.J. 973, 998 (2001).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(3) (2000).
62. Section 12,113(a) of the ADA creates an affirmative defense for employers who
make employment decisions under a qualification standard which is "shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity." Under § 12,113(b), this standard may
include a requirement that the individual in question "not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace" if the individual cannot perform the job with
reasonable accommodation, under § 12,113(a).
63. See E.E.O.C. v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 429 (W.D. Va. 1996) (citing
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r)) (holding that, based on an analysis of the four-factor test under the
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interpretation of the statutory language of the ADA. Specifically, the term
"qualification standard" includes a threat to the individual himself as well
as a "threat to others." ' The interpretation of the direct threat defense to
include a threat to the individual's health and safety creates a loophole for
employers making hiring decisions: this makes it possible for
presymptomatic individuals who are at risk for developing a certain disease
to be denied employment because of the future risk of injury they pose to
themselves. 65 Under the EEOC's interpretation, the applicant may legally
be denied a position if the employer decides that the future risk of harm is
too great. Giving the power of decision to the employer poses many
problems.66 In 2002, this controversial interpretation was addressed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal.67
Mario Echazabal had worked in oil refineries owned by Chevron since
the early 1970' S.68 He initially worked for independent contractors of
Chevron's oil refinery, mainly in the coker unit.69  In 1992, Echazabal
decided to apply to work directly for Chevron, and he received an offer for
employment contingent on his passing a physical examination.7 °
Chevron's doctors conducted the preemployment physical exam and
discovered that he was producing enzymes in his liver at an abnormally
high rate.71 Consequently, Echazabal failed the test and was not offered the
job.72 Following this first exam, he sought medical treatment with several
ADA, a shoe salesman's epileptic seizures did not rise to the level of "high probability of
substantial harm" necessary for the employer to successfully assert the direct threat
defense).
64. See 29 CFR § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001) ("The term 'qualification standard' may include
a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the
individual or others in the workplace.").
65. See Amanda J. Wong, Distinguishing Speculative and Substantial Risk in the
Presymptomatic Job Applicant: Interpreting the Interpretation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Direct Threat Defense, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1145 (2000) (predicting the
problems that could be encountered by presymptomatic individuals under this interpretation,
and arguing that "[a]dverse employment decisions based on speculation and future risk of
injury are illegal under the ADA; but if an employer is able to characterize speculation
regarding future risk of injury as a direct threat to self, then it becomes a valid reason for
disqualification.").
66. See id. at 1146 ("The grant of such power to employers also creates a greater
incentive to find that a presymptomatic individual poses a direct threat to himself and, based
on that assumption, to screen him out.... [P]lacing the decision in the hands of employers
provides them with a means of avoiding compliance with the ADA, reducing the incentive
to work to accommodate the disabled and to reduce environmental hazards overall in the
workplace.").
67. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).






doctors of his own choosing, and discovered that he had asymptomatic,
chronic active hepatitis C.73 Although Echazabal informed each doctor of
the conditions at the plant where he worked, and even provided one with a
document which detailed the specific environmental toxins that were
present at the coker unit, none advised him to discontinue working at his
job.
In 1995, Echazabal tried again to get a position with Chevron.
Chevron gave him a conditional offer, contingent, once again, on his
passing a physical examination, and again he failed.75 This time, Chevron
wrote to the independent contractor employing Echazabal to "immediately
remove Mr. Echazabal from the refinery or place him in a position that
eliminates his exposure to solvents/chemicals. 76 Echazabal then filed suit,
removed to federal court, and alleged that Chevron had discriminated
against him by not hiring him or even allowing him to continue working at
the coker unit because of his liver condition.77
The district court granted summary judgment for Chevron, relying on
the EEOC's regulation that an employer can defend against a
discrimination claim if allowing the employee to work at the particular job
would cause a direct threat to that individual's health or safety.78 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, relying on the limitations stated in the
ADA, which do not include threats to an individual's own health or safety
in its statutory language.79
The Supreme Court, disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court,
addressed the issue of paternalism in its Echazabal decision, stating:
It is true that Congress had paternalism in its sights when it
passed the ADA, see § 12,101(a)(5) (recognizing "overprotective
rules and policies" as a form of discrimination).... The direct
threat defense must be "based on a reasonable medical judgment
that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best
available objective evidence," and upon an expressly
"individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to
safely perform the essential functions of the job" reached after
considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and
the severity of the harm portended. 29 CFR §1630.2(r) (2001).





77. Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76-77 (2002).
78. Id. at 77.
79. Id.
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it saw a difference between rejecting workplace paternalism and
ignoring specific and documented risks to the employee himself,
even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of
getting a job. °
The Court went on to distinguish other paternalistic decisions that
were concerned with "the broad category of gender" from the EEOC's
requirement that judgments to determine direct threat be "made on the basis
of individualized risk assessments.' The Court refers to these other
decisions as "beside the point. ' 8 2 Yet through Echazabal, the justices of
the Supreme Court have written a decision anchored in what they
recognized the ADA was designed to prevent against: paternalism towards
the disabled.83
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED BY WORKERS
AS A RESULT OF DECISIONS LIKE ECHAZABAL WHEN GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION IS NOT REGULATED UNDER A CONSISTENT AND STRONG
POLICY
Echazabal was denied a conditional offer because the results of his
physical examination revealed that he had a liver condition that could be
exacerbated over time. However, under the ADA, it is unlawful to
withdraw a conditional offer of employment for any medical reason except
that the individual is unable, even with a reasonable accommodation, to
perform the essential functions of the job. 84 Echazabal was certainly
physically able to perform the essential functions of his job. Having a
disease like Hepatitis C does not prevent one from being able to work at a
coker factory in any imaginable way. Yet Chevron was legally able, under
80. Id. at 85-86. For an example of a post-Echazabal case that balances these factors in
order to make a determination of whether an applicant would be posing a direct threat to his
health or safety by performing his job, see Collins v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., No. 01-1415-
JTM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1148, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 16, 2003). In Collins, the
employee's physical condition (fused disk and metal rodding to stabilize his spine) was
permanent and the potential for injury while working as an airplane assembly worker was
"substantial and severe." Id. at *15. A doctor testified that he would have an inherently
increased risk of additional injury, and that the risk would be "constant and ongoing"
because of the nature of the job. Id. at *15-16.
81. 536 U.S. at 86.
82. Id.
83. Lacy, supra note 20, at 89 ("[T]he ADA's direct threat defense... should be
limited to those instances where a person with a disability cannot perform the functions of
the job or puts others at harm in doing the job. If the particular harm is only to oneself, the
person is not unable to do the job and cannot be barred from doing so. Any other result
contravenes the anti-paternalistic purpose of the ADA.").
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(a) (2000).
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the EEOC's interpretation of ADA language, to rescind its conditional offer
based on the "future risk" that Echazabal's disease presented to his own
health.
Echazabal is a troubling decision for many reasons, but for the
purpose of this Comment, it is the most recent evidence that genetic
discrimination simply cannot be addressed solely by the regulations of the
ADA. It has been suggested that "employers may deny employment
opportunities on the ground that work site conditions or job responsibilities
could make workers' own biological anomalies develop into pathologies or
disabilities," and that the potential is great for use of the direct threat
defense in this area.85 While ADA case law purports to require a "high
probability of substantial harm" before an employer can assert the direct
threat defense,86 the Supreme Court's decision in Echazabal contravenes
the wisdom of such precedent. Echazabal's current condition did not
prevent him from performing the essential functions of his job, just as the
current condition of an employee with a genetic predisposition for multiple
sclerosis would not prevent that employee from performing at their job.
Instead of making the determination of the direct threat based on the
current condition of the applicant or employee, Echazabal requires a
consideration of the possible effect that the condition will have on that
individual's "future health." Then the employer has the power to decide
whether the individual should take that risk.
Echazabal's expansion of the direct threat defense is the most recent
wake-up call for a comprehensive legislative policy to regulate genetic
information separately from the sub-par coverage it would receive under
the ADA. We simply cannot have employers gaining access to predictive
health information, especially when the Supreme Court has given
employers the go-ahead to decide which risks their employees should take
with their own lives. While some states have proceeded with such
legislation, others have not even addressed the issue. Echazabal represents
the problems that could arise if a genetic discrimination case is heard under
the ADA. Without additional legislation, employees that litigate under the
ADA with no success may have no other protective legislation if they live
in a state which has little or no additional safeguards for genetic
discrimination. The potential for a lack of protection in an area that is
85. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Human Rights and Genetic Discrimination:
Protecting Genomics' Promise For Public Health, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 377, 380 (2003).
86. See, e.g., Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc. 263 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir.
2001) (refusing employer's attempt to assert the direct threat defense when it could not
provide any evidence that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her job
because of a seizure disorder); Hamlin v. Charter Township, 165 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir.
1999) (refusing to allow employer to assert direct threat defense in a case with a firechief
who was unable to fight fires because of a heart condition when the alleged risk was
"speculative or remote.").
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likely to affect large numbers of individuals is simply unacceptable.
V. WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE SINCE
ECHAZABAL WAS DECIDED?
The impact of Echazabal on discrimination suits brought under the
ADA has recently begun. Evidently, Echazabal has given judges the go-
ahead to seize decisions of whether a risk to employee health or safety
should preclude that individual from remaining at his or her job.
In an Administrative Board decision, an employee who worked in the
Department of Treasury for the Internal Revenue Service brought action
against her employer for disability discrimination under the ADA. 7 The
employee had a respiratory condition, symptoms of which included
sensitivity to chemicals and intolerance to irritants and neurotoxins (among
others), and resulted in impairments in her ability to think, breathe, walk,
eat, and make use of her hands.88 After requesting medical opinions, the
agency determined that it was unlikely to find a position for her where she
would be safe, given her degree of dysfunction.8 9 The court, however, went
on to rely on Echazabal, stating that even if reasonable accommodations
could have provided her with sufficient protection from workplace toxins,
the employee "failed to demonstrate that the accommodations would
provide sufficient protection such that she could 'safely' perform the duties
of her position as required by 29 C.F.R. [section] 1614.203(a)(6)." 90 After
further discussing the medical opinions issued regarding her condition and
the likelihood that it would worsen even given some accommodations, the
court paternalistically concluded that "although the appellant's willingness
to work is admirable, we find that the consequences resulting from an
accidental exposure could prove irreversibly catastrophic to her health." 91
Echazabal gave the green light to courts to make these private health
determinations for employees, but the question remains whether this kind
of paternalism is misplaced.
In Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ,9 a pharmacist alleged disability
discrimination under the ADA because he was an insulin-dependent
diabetic and could not perform certain major life activities as a result of his
condition.93 The district court found that his condition was not covered by
87. Nanette, 92 M.S.P.R. 127 (2002).
88. Id. at 127-28, 133. Thus, the employee was a qualified individual under the
definition of the ADA. Id. at 134.
89. Id. at 128-29.
90. Id. at 140.
91. Id. at 140-41.
92. 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 722-23.
GENETIC NONDISCRIMINATION POLICY
the ADA, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.94 Interesting
to note, however, was the Circuit Court's suggestion in footnote five:
Had Orr established a prima facie case of actual disability under
the ADA, Wal-Mart could have raised the threat-to-self defense.
Wal-Mart could have argued that, accepting Orr's contentions at
face value, working in a single-pharmacist pharmacy, which did
not provide for uninterrupted meal breaks, posed a direct threat to
Orr's health and that Wal-Mart was justified in not continuing his
employment. 95
While not indicating how the argument would have fared under Eighth
Circuit precedent, the fact that the court suggests this argument shows that
it is open to the threat-to-self defense outlined in Echazabal, and implies
that the Court encourages more employers to assert the defense. Wal-Mart
probably could not have raised much of an argument under the direct
threat-to-others defense before Echazabal. Yet, post-Echazabal, Wal-Mart
can apparently claim that the possibility that an (adult) diabetic could fail to
regulate his blood sugar properly could be a great enough threat to the
employee's own health and safety at a pharmacy to justify firing that
employee-a rather absurd result, since most diabetics can easily regulate
their blood sugar. The result is particularly daunting for those with genetic
predispositions: if an employer can defend by asserting that the chance that
a diabetic may not be able to regulate his blood sugar is enough of a threat
to his health or safety, perhaps the employer can claim the same thing for
those who have genetic dispositions that might arise at some time in the
future. If employers are allowed to see predictive genetic information, they
may now be able to argue that the possibility that an applicant may exhibit
symptoms of the condition sometime in the future is a great enough threat
to the individual's safety so as to justify not hiring that individual.
Whether it is pretextual or an exhibition of "true concern" for the
employee, it is certainly discriminatory in nature and should not be
allowed.
Somewhat encouraging, however, is the recent case of Knutson v. AG
Processing, Inc.96 Knutson was a boiler operator with some back
impairment from a repaired hernia which prevented him from operating the
boilers only if the system was not working as it should.97 However, if the
system was working correctly, his condition would not prevent him from
94. Id. at 724-25.
95. Id. at 725 n.5.
96. 273 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
97. Id. at 976-77.
20051
428 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:2
doing the essential functions of his job.98 Yet, Knutson's employer
continued to assign him to light duty tasks against the recommendations of
medical experts that he was fully capable of performing the tasks of a
boiler operator. 99  Eventually, AG Processing terminated Knutson's
employment. The court upheld a jury verdict which determined that
Knutson was a qualified individual who was perceived as being disabled as
per the ADA.' °° Further, the jury found that Mr. Knutson could perform
the essential components of his job with or without accommodation, and
the court upheld this aspect of the verdict as well.1 °1
AG Processing claimed that Mr. Knutson was similar to Mr.
Echazabal, and that the threat-to-self defense should have been available to
them as it was in Echazabal.10 2 The court rightly made the distinction that
in Echazabal, the employer relied on medical opinions that indicated
Echazabal's condition would worsen if he were to continue at his job. 103
However, if AG had correctly interpreted Knutson's medical reports, it
would have come to quite the opposite opinion. The medical reports stated
that Knutson could, in fact, perform all of the essential duties of a boiler
operator, yet AG continued to place him on light duty tasks. 1°4 This led the
jury to conclude that the employer perceived Knutson as having a
disability, qualifying him under the ADA, and further, that the threat-to-self
defense could not be asserted, since the medical reports indicated that he
could have performed the essential functions of the job without exposing
him to additional health risks.'0 5
This case points out the importance of medical reports when a
disability is involved. If genetic tests could predict the probability that an
individual would come down with a certain disorder, perhaps a well-written
medical report could portray this information to the employer while
maintaining that the employee was still fully capable of performing the
essential tasks of the employee's job. The best solution, however, would
prevent employers from becoming biased by absolutely prohibiting them
from seeing the results of the predictive tests in the first place, thereby
eliminating the risk of added discrimination altogether.
98. Id. at 979.
99. Id. at 990.
100. Id. "The inquiry into whether an employee is a 'qualified individual' within the
meaning of the ADA has two prongs: the individual must (1) possess the requisite skill,
education, experience, and training for the position; and (2) be able to perform the essential
job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation." Id.
101. Id. at 994.
102. Id. at 989.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 989-90.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing employers to be privy to genetic information presents
another opportunity for discrimination in the workplace. The ADA was
passed in 1990, and is insufficient to deal with a problem that was hardly
conceivable when it was enacted. The better alternative is to base
employment decisions only on the present state of the employee's abilities.
Employers should be allowed to assert the "direct threat" defense only
when the threat is definite and significant. Predictive genetic tests are not
definite and the threat certainly does not rise to the level of "direct" if there
is no manifested condition. Only when the individual evidences behaviors
associated with his condition which prevent him from performing his job
does a threat arise. Consistent state or federal legislation is increasingly
becoming a necessity as we rely more heavily on genetic technologies.
Only by enacting a more comprehensive legislative policy will employees
be able to face the future without impending fears of discrimination based
on genetic abnormalities that may never even manifest themselves
symptomatically.
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